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This paper explores the self-organising principles of horizontally-integrated innovation networks.  It is
shown that such networks can self-organising in environments where the co-ordination and production of
new knowledge is itself a complex, dynamic and highly non-linear processes.  The paper argues the
development of a self-organisation perspective of innovation networks has two advantages.  First, it
provides a general framework of dynamic systems in which different strands of a highly fragmented
literature can be drawn together.  Second, formal self-organisation modelling techniques can provide
interesting new insights into the micro-macro processes driving dynamic innovation systems.
Section 1 of the paper identifies the four key principles of self-organisation: local interaction, non-linearity,
thermodynamic openness and emergence.  Section 2 discusses important complementarities between self-
organisation theory and the ‘new’ theory of innovation, with the latter’s emphasis of the systemic nature of
knowledge production within innovation networks containing multiple private and public institutions that
are connected in highly complicated and non-linear ways.  This paves the way for a formal model of self-
organising innovation networks presented in section 3.   Section 4 discusses the main properties of the
outputs generated by the model and its novel insights, section 5 summarising and considering the potential
advantages for current and future research offered by the self-organisation approach.
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1. Self-organisation theory
Self-organisation theory is, to date, overwhelmingly the product of research conducted in
the natural science disciplines of physics, chemistry and biology.  Classic contributions to
the area include Bertalanffy (1968), Haken (1978), Maturana and Varela (1980), and
Prigogine (1984).  Silverberg
1 has argued the relevance of the self-organisation modelling
approach developed by Eigen, Haken and Prigogine to economics.  Yet few economists
have subsequently taken up this line of research.  In this paper we use this modelling
approach to explore the emergence of innovation networks as a self-organising property
of a dynamic economic landscape in which the co-ordination and production of new
knowledge is itself a complex interactive process.
The principal characteristics of self-organising systems are outlined by Forrest and Jones
(1994), and Prigogine and Nicolis (1984).  The fundamental research question addressed
is ‘Where does order come from?’.  The general laws of thermodynamics suggest that
dynamic processes will follow a path of least energy until the system finds a
thermodynamic equilibrium, where it will remain unless it is externally perturbed.  Yet
the physical world abounds with systems that maintain a high internal energy and
organisation that, at least at first sight, appear to defy the laws of physics.  Rather than
moving towards a state of maximum entropy (total chaos) it appears that organisation
arises from initially disordered conditions.
The first, and most commonly noted, condition for a self-organising physical ‘system’
(such as an organism or a population) is thermodynamic openness.  A self-organising
system exchanges energy and/or mass with its environment such that there is a nonzero
flow of energy through the system.  If this is not the case then, according to the second
law of thermodynamics, all available usable energy in the system will be used up and the
system will approach a state of maximum entropy (a thermodynamic equilibrium). A
system can avoid collapsing into a local equilibrium providing it is able to import usable
energy from its environment and export entropy back to it.  The system does not violate
the second law of thermodynamics because it is part of a larger system-environment unit.
This entropy-exporting dynamic is the fundamental feature of what chemists and
physicists call dissipative structures.  It is often said that physical systems that are self-
organising are ‘far from’ thermodynamic equilibrium.  It is presumably more accurate to
state that a system only needs to be far enough to avoid collapsing into a local
equilibrium condition.  If a system is neither at nor near equilibrium, then it will be
undergoing some form of change in behaviour and is said to be dynamic.
A second characteristic of self-organising systems is local interaction.  All natural
systems have inherently local interactions, every event having some location and some
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range of effect (Kawata and Toquenaga, 1994).  The focus on local interaction goes hand-
in-hand with a bottom-up approach to systems modelling that emphasises variety in
micro behaviour. Higher-level structures, it is argued,  are the product of subtle
differences within a heterogeneous community and the local interactions that occur
between the individual members (component elements) of a community. Small
differences can lead to larger differences, such as changes in the population gene
frequencies, size or location that in turn can have cascading effects at still larger scales.
A third characteristic of self-organisation models is non-linearity of the local interactions
between different system elements.  A system may contain a set of feedback loops, some
of which are positive and some negative.  Self-organisation can either occur when
feedback loops exist among component parts, or else between lower and higher
hierarchical levels.
One of the most interesting, but still imprecise, propositions of self-organisation theory is
that of ‘emergence’ (see Crutchfield, 1994).  This states that higher-order phenomena can
spontaneously arise from the interactions of the lower parts.  In itself this does not seem
particularly contentious.  Indeed emergence is a key property underpinning not just
economics but all social theory.  If systems were simply reducible to atomistic
individuals then there would be no need to investigate the economic (or any other)
interactions between individuals.  Silverberg et al (1988) observe that in economics we
see “complex interdependent dynamical systems unfolding in historical, i.e. irreversible,
time,  economic agents, who make decision today the correctness of which will only be
revealed considerably later, are confronted with irreducible uncertainty and holistic
interactions between each other and with aggregate variables” (Silverberg et al, 1988,
p.1036, italics in original).  Thus the emergence property is linked to the presence of
multi-scale effects in self-organising systems.  Small-scale interactions produce a ‘field’
at the macro level that in turn influences and modifies activity at the small-scale.
2. The systemic nature of knowledge generation: innovation networks
Transactions cost analysis has considered the conditions under which either markets or
vertically integrated hierarchies arise as key structures for the co-ordination of economic
activities in capitalist market economies.  However this discussion seems to have been
superseded by events.  The prevalence of an intermediate form of co-ordination - the
innovation network - is such that one can no longer ignore or dismiss innovation
networks as an inefficient, and hence temporary, phenomenon that should give way to
either a market or a hierarchical structure.  The growing prevalence of networks since the
1980s suggests that the object under study has now changed to such an extent that we
must explicitly consider this new phenomenon.  In this section of the paper we consider
how different ‘stylised facts’ of innovation can be brought together under the self-
organisation rubric.  As noted in section 1, the core concepts and modelling methods of
self-organisation theory have been formulated within natural science disciplines.4
Transferring and applying these to the social domain is a non-trivial issue which must be
conducted with care.  Furthermore, the success of such a venture will be judged on the
ability to appreciate social phenomena that cannot be appreciated under an existing
(alternative) theoretical perspective.  In this section we consider the synergies between
the self-organisation perspective and that which underpins the ‘new’ theory of
innovation.   This prepares the way for the formal model of self-organising innovation
networks presented in section 3.
Self-organisation theory appears to complement, in many ways, the perspective of the so-
called ‘new’ theory of innovation that has been developed over the last couple of
decades.  A defining characteristic of the ‘new’ theory is the emphasis it places on the
systemic nature of knowledge production - the generation of new knowledge involves
multiple private and public institutions, often in very complicated ways.  One cornerstone
of the ‘new view’ is the chain-link model of science and technology first developed by
Rosenberg and Kline (Rosenberg, 1982; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Rosenberg, 1992).
This highlights the multitude of interactions that link every phase of the innovation
process within industrial organisations and the wider economic, scientific and
technological environment in which organisations operate.  Interactions between
scientific and technological knowledge bases are complex and non-linear with numerous
feedbacks (Swann, 1996).  Recognising this, the chain-link model warns against
privileging either the science or the technology knowledge base.  The other cornerstone
of the ‘new view’ is the proposition that problem-solving has become more complicated.
On the one hand, it is argued, the number of different knowledge fields that must be
mastered has proliferated (Senker and Faulkner, 1992; Kodama, 1996).  On the other, the
rate of technical and scientific change seems to be increasing.  Consequently no single
firm (or any other institution for that matter) has sufficient resources to keep at the
leading-edge of knowledge.  The upshot is the emergence of a new organisational
structure - innovation networks - that encompass heterogeneous (private and public
sector) institutions and knowledge fields.
In this paper we focus on the rationale for co-operative behaviour and its implications for
firms’ competitive strategies.  Specifically, we are interested in co-operation within
horizontally structured innovation networks that are open with respect to their
environment.  Co-operation can take one of two forms; formal knowledge exchange
through collaborative R&D and informal knowledge exchange.  The advantage of formal
collaborative relationships is the ability to put in place IPR clauses, confidentially
agreements and other contractual measures designed to safeguard the firm against
knowledge spill-over.  However, these measures are costly to instigate and police.  By
contrast, a key attraction of informal relationships is their low co-ordination costs; they
are relatively simple, uncomplicated and more flexible (Hakanson H. and Johanson, J.,
1988).  Von Hippel (1989) found evidence of informal know-how trading in several
industries. What is interesting about von Hippel’s study is his suggestion that informal
know-how trading is a voluntary exchange of technical information and, as such,
represents a process designed to initiate technological spill-overs.  There are, he argues,5
good strategic reasons for this.  If the value of the information each firm is willing to
release is less than the expected value of reciprocated information then firms will
exchange their knowledge voluntarily.  The argument is interesting but, for this process
to continue over time, strong assumptions are made about firms’ abilities to evaluate and
process information.  Nelson (1988) has similarly suggested that a more liberal attitude
towards knowledge appropriation is emerging, noting that “in some cases firms take
positive actions to make their proprietary knowledge available to others” (Nelson, 1988,
p. 318).  However the strategic motivation cited by Nelson is very different to that put
forward by von Hippel.  On the one hand, Nelson reiterates the ‘new’ view of innovation
by stating that changing environmental conditions - increasing complexity and the high
speed of innovation processes - are to some extent forcing firms to a adopt a more open
position.  In addition he observes that diffusing certain types of know-how can be
beneficial to a competitor.  If a firm’s proprietary technology becomes the industry
standard then it gains enormous advantages because all subsequent innovations that built
on that standard are readily understood and appropriated by the standard-setter.  In this
way Nelson makes a link with work by Arthur (1989), David (1985) and (starting from a
different perspective) Katz and Shapiro (1985) on systemic lock-in to de facto standards.
Networking is a means of reducing an individual firm’s exposure in a new technology
field.  As Abernathy and Utterback (1975) observed, a high degree of uncertainty and
fluidity is associated with the creation and introduction of a radically new product.
Uncertainty with respect to market size, product design, consumer tastes and
technological constraints typically leads to a variety of designs being offered, reflecting
different firms’ bets about the future.  This period of technological uncertainty ends with
the emergence of one or a small number of designs that are stable enough (i.e. profitable
and technically feasible) to support a significant volume of production.  R&D ties may
extend beyond one product life cycle.  Technological evolution is characterised by
mutual interdependencies between different core technologies.  New opportunities can be
created through the fusion of, what were previously thought of as unrelated, knowledge
fields.  These cross-fertilisation effects have been discussed by Basalla (1988), Mokyr
(1990), Kodama (1996), and Windrum and Birchenhall (1998).  Kodama (1996) has
highlighted  the ability of Japanese companies, operating in stable keiretzu networks, to
identify new mutual interdependencies between different core technologies.
The process of recombination and synthesis is not easy to manage or exploit.  It is a
creative act that invariably generates a fresh set of technical problems needing to be
solved.  Success not only depends on the technical competences of the individual firms
making up a network but also on intra-network learning.  Successful collaboration
between firms holding complimentary assets requires the creation and management of
linkages between their respective competencies and knowledge bases.  This entails an
understanding of what partners can reasonably expect of each other (their relative
strengths and weaknesses) and how partners’ competences can be synthesised together to
create an innovative product.  This type of intra-network learning is cumulative, tacit and
specialised, and requires the establishment of stable, long-term relationships.  In addition6
to economies due to learning by doing and using previously highlighted in the economics
of innovation literature, there exist learning economies of networking that are based on
routine and experience of collaboration with particular partners within innovation
networks.  In the presence of such a feedback, the expected long-term returns to co-
operation, combined with previous sunk investments in intra-network learning, may be
sufficient to keep in check short-term opportunism amongst network partners.
Multi-scale effects are also likely to be present, with a second feedback loop existing
between the emerging organisational structures observed in an industry and individual
decision-making.  If the returns to networked R&D are frequency-dependent, i.e. returns
depends on the share of firms engaged in innovation networks, then bandwagons can
arise.  If the number of networked firms is increasing, the gains to co-operative behaviour
increase on average, making it more attractive for other firms to join an innovation
network. One may reasonably expect to see a positive feedback between individual
decisions to invest in collective knowledge production, the economic returns to each
member of a network, and an increasingly open attitude towards further knowledge
sharing.  Alternatively, a negative feedback can arise if an increasing number firms
decide to leave their respective networks in order to innovate independently.  Then the
returns to networking will decline on average, reducing still further the incentive to
belong to an innovation network.
3. Modelling the self-organisation of innovation networks
In order to further investigate the properties giving rise to the innovation networks in
complex learning environments, we present a formal model of self-organising networks
that develops earlier work by Pyka (1999).  In this paper we focus on the system
dynamics arising from a feedback between emerging organisational structures and
individual decision-making.  The model contains the four key features of self-
organisation described in section 1 of this paper: local interaction, non-linearity,
thermodynamic openness and emergence.  The model draws on Haken’s synergetic
approach (Haken, 1978) and is based on a Master-Equation algorithm (see Weidlich and
Haag, 1983).  The other notable feature of the model is its evolutionary character.  Unlike
more traditional neo-classical approaches, an optimisation calculus is no longer
approached, but the evolution of a network structure depends on the prevailing degree of
co-operation and the technological intensity of the industry.
The model contains a population of firms (agents) that collectively make up an industry.
In each period, every firm must decide whether to ‘join a technology network’ or else ‘go
it alone’.  A firm that joins a network chooses to act co-operatively, voluntarily disclosing
its existing (including newly acquired)  know-how and exchanging this knowledge with
other firms.  This creates the basis for an informal innovation network in which7
knowledge is pooled. Alternatively, if a firm decides to act independently then it does not
disclose its existing know-how and competes directly with all other firms.  The need to
exchange knowledge and access external knowledge sources increases when a firm can
no longer reasonably expect to be successful through its own efforts.  This is particularly
true if the innovation process is characterised by increasing complexity and accelerating
rate of change.  In making their decisions, firms are strongly influenced by the choices of
other firms within the same competitive environment.  Hence one would expect strong
bandwagon effects as decisions to act co-operatively are affected by the numbers of firms
that already engage in informal networking.
The behaviour of agents is captured in the model by ‘individual transition rates’.  They
are the key aspect of a Master-Equation and describe the probability of an agent changing
his/her behaviour. In this model the behaviour of interest is the choice between co-
operative innovation through networks versus competition based on individual R&D.
There are two conditions under which there is a high probability of a firm changing its
behaviour.  The first is when the size of the co-operative environment is growing.  If the
number of co-operating firms - and hence the returns to the external knowledge pool - is
growing, the gains of co-operative behaviour increases, making it more attractive for
other firms to join the network.  The second case occurs when the opposite conditions
prevail.  There is a high probability of a firm changing its behaviour when the size of the
co-operative environment is declining.  If the environment is initially co-operative but
there is an increasing number of firms who decide to leave the network(s) and to innovate
independently, then returns to the external knowledge pool will decline, further reducing
the attractiveness of belonging to a network.  To summarise, the probability of switching
to co-operative behaviour increases as a network grows while the probability of switching
to competitive behaviour increases as a network declines.
This discussion of mutual learning contains the first characteristic of self-organising
systems outlined in section 1; local interaction.  As discussed in section 2, technological
knowledge is highly specific at two levels, at the level of the firm and the level of the
technological artefact.  First, technological learning is very localised in nature (Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1969).  New technological improvements are not evenly spread across an
economy over time but tend to concentrate within a limited range of technologies for
extended periods of time.  Second, new technical know-how contains highly tacit
elements (Polanyi, 1962) which tends to tie new understanding and know-how to the
specific skills and competencies of the firms that generate new technological knowledge.
These two aspects of technological innovation make it difficult for other firms to
appropriate knowledge.  Low technology spill-overs are beneficial if a firm seeks to gain
a competitive  advantage by independently innovating.  However if, as suggested by the
‘new theory’ of innovation, the increasing complexity of knowledge production requires
alternative innovation structures – notably innovation networks – are required, then
appropriability difficulties become a disadvantage, not an advantage. Successful8
collaboration between firms with complimentary assets requires the creation of linkages
between their respective competencies and knowledge bases.  This does not entail perfect
learning of what the other knows.  Rather, it means developing an understanding of what
other partners can and cannot do, how these competencies link with ones own
competence, and how these can be synthesised together to create an innovative product.
Clearly it takes time to build up these understandings.  It is not sufficient to simply
indicate a co-operative attitude. The returns to co-operative behaviour depend on the
reciprocity of knowledge exchange
2.
Formally, the transition rate for co-operative (co) to competitive (c) behaviour pcoﬁc(x)
depends on network size x (x˛{-1,1}).
p x x co c ﬁ = ￿ - ￿ ( ) exp[ ( )] a b 1 (1)
where ai is a frequency parameter and b is technological intensity.
x = -1 when there is a purely competitive environment, x = 0 if there is an equal
distribution of co-operative and competitive firms, and x = 1 for an innovation network in
which all firms participate.
The transition rates are not perfectly symmetric with respect to switches between
competitive and co-operative behaviours.  This is because firms changing from
competition to co-operation are confronted with networking costs.  This the transition
rate from competitive to co-operative behaviour pcﬁco(x) is given by
p x x x c co ﬁ = ￿ ￿ - + ( ) exp( ) /[ exp( )] a b a 1 2 1 (2)
The second term on the right side of transition rate (2) additionally captures positive but
decreasing networking costs.  First, there are some difficulties to be expected in drawing
on external knowledge sources and the knowledge flows within the network are not
easily used for own purposes.  With an increasing size of the network, however, an
adequate understanding is developed and networking costs are decreasing due to routine
and experience (learning-by-networking); in other words, there are economies of scale in
networking.  The resulting sigmoid function is illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Networking costs
The exponential formulation of the first terms on the right side of the transition rates
captures another feature of self-organising systems: non-linearity giving rise to short-
term, self-enhancing and wide-range attenuation (Gierer, 1981).  Initially an expanding
network will support the beneficial effects of mutual learning in a co-operative
environment. However, there are two reasons for an attenuation of this effect in the long
run.  First, due to technological limitations, the technological opportunities of a specific
technology are not unrestricted.  Thus with the depletion of technological opportunities,
networking becomes less attractive.  Second, the heterogeneity of firms within a network
decreases because they become technologically closer through the very act of sharing
their know-how.  Dodgson notes that “If firms in a network share knowledge over a
longer period, then they will increasingly come to resemble one another with detrimental
consequences for novelty and innovation” (Dodgson, 1996, p. 67).  Since heterogeneity is
a necessary precondition for spill-overs with high information content, increasing
homogeneity makes further exchanges less attractive (there is less to be ‘exchanged’)
leading to decreasing returns to networking.
Ceteris paribus, the restricted technological opportunities of a specific technological path
will tend to reduce the dynamics of technological evolution, with similar effects on the
importance of networking and mutual learning.  However, as discussed in section 2,
technological evolution is characterised by mutual interdependencies between different
core technologies.  New technological opportunities can be created through the fusion of,
what were previously thought of as unrelated, knowledge fields.  The other key source of
interaction discussed in section 2 is between technological and scientific knowledge
bases, developments in each frequent having impacts on the other.  These cross
fertilisations restore the heterogeneity in the technological approaches of firms and
correspond to the third feature of self-organising systems: thermodynamic openness.
There are continuous inputs into the system, in the sense of exploring new extensive
technological opportunities emerging from within as well as coming from the
environment.  These prevent the system from falling into a local equilibrium and reaching
stasis.10
Using the transition rates of equation (1) and (2) we form a Master-Equation.  Using this
Master-Equation we can compute the probability of a change from one type of network
configuration to another (i.e. from competition to co-operation and vice-versa) at each
moment in time, and thereby determine the change in probability to meet a network of a
certain size 
dt
t x dP ) ; (
 in each time period.  The Master-Equation for our system of
evolving informal networks is;
) ; ( ) ( ) ; ( ) (
) ; 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ; 1 ( ) 1 (
) ; (
t x P x p t x P x p
t x P x p t x P x p
dt
t x dP
c co co c
c co co c
￿ - ￿ -
+ ￿ + + - ￿ - =
ﬁ ﬁ
ﬁ ﬁ (3)
Thus, the master-equation is a kind of profit and loss account of the probability to meet a
specific configuration x at time t.  The change of this probability depends on four
different probability fluxes describing movements out and into a specific state.  The
above two terms with a positive sign  ;t) P(x ) (x p ;t) P(x ) (x p c co co c 1 1 1 1 + ￿ + + - ￿ - ﬁ ﬁ
capture the positive effect on state x arising from a change in probability fluxes from a
neighbouring state (x-1 or x+1).  Changes in these aggregate probability fluxes are driven
by movements of individual firms between neighbouring states. These arise whenever
firms decide to change their behaviour and either join an informal network (x-1) or else
leave a network and ‘go it alone’ (x+1).  In either case, the probability that a specific
configuration x (distribution of co-operative and competitive firms) will dominate the
system increases as a consequence of a flux from one behavioural state to another.  The
below two terms with a negative sign  ) ; ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( t x P x p t x P x p c co co c ￿ - ￿ - ﬁ ﬁ  capture the
negative impact of a probability flux, due to departing firms who have changed their
behaviour, on the original behavioural state.  Changes in firm behaviour decrease this
probability, raising the probability of attraction to a neighbouring state.11
4. Results
There are three possible end states in this model;
(1) coexistence of co-operative and competitive behaviour
(2) dominance by co-operative behaviour
(3) dominance by competitive behaviour
Unfortunately, given its highly non-linear character, traditional analytic methods do not


















we find that convergence to one or other end state is sensitive to changes in the value of
the technology intensity parameter (b).  Indeed, as the vector field in figure 2 shows, the
system undergoes a phase transition as the value of b is increased.  For low b-values
(b<1) we find an unique mean value indicated by two arrows facing each other.  This
corresponds to a state of maximum entropy, as discussed in section 1.  Here one cannot
predict ex ante whether a firm picked at random will co-operative or competitive in
behaviour.
As the value of b increases, so we begin to see the emergence of organisation from
initially disordered conditions.  In the area of b=1 the mean-value becomes fuzzy, and for
even higher b values (b>1) we observe two alternative development paths.  The existence
of a phase transition highlights the fourth characteristic of self-organising systems
discussed in section 2: the emergence of discrete and highly differentiated macro patterns
that are due to small changes in micro behaviour.  In this case, significantly different
network structures arise at higher technological intensities b (i.e. fast pace of
technological progress, cross-fertilisation effects, inputs from the scientific realm etc.).
Below a certain threshold, co-operative and competitive behaviours can co-exist in
comparatively egalitarian distributions.  However, above this threshold the system tends
towards end states in which one or other behaviour dominates.
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Figure 2.  Mean values (grey shaded area) x in dependence of technological intensity b
Given the model’s non-linear character, we shall proceed to investigate its properties
through a series of simulation exercises which consider the Master-Equation under a
number of alternative scenarios.  Before discussing the results, we need to make some
preliminary remarks on simulation exercises reported here. Each simulation run consists
of 2.000 periods. The frequency parameters a1 and a2 are fixed at 0.25 and 0.01
respectively for all simulation runs. Finally, the initial distribution is P(x=0;1) =1; i.e.
there is an equal probability of co-operative and competing firms at the outset of each
simulation run.
In the first scenario we explore the behaviour of the system when technological intensity
is relatively low (b = 0.8).  Figure 3 illustrates the kind of probability distributions P(x)
that emerge in order to meet a certain network size x over time t.  In this case the system
tends to converge to a uni-modal stationary solution with the population of firms is
divided into two equivalently sized groups, one acting co-operatively and the other
competitively
4.  In other words, in an environment where technology is not of major
importance, the short-term self-enhancing and wide-range attenuation effect prevents
larger networks from forming.  Technological opportunities are quickly depleted and the
technological resemblance of firms means a networking strategy loses importance in the
course of time.
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Figure 3.  System development with low technological intensity (b < 1)
Figure 4 illustrates a second scenario where technological intensity b = 1.  This
approaches the critical value identified by our earlier investigation of the mean-value
equation.  While the median of the end state is the same as the first scenario, it takes
longer for the system to reach a stationary distribution.  What is more, the final
distribution is considerably different to that which emerges under the first scenario
(Figure 3).  The distribution that emerges under the second scenario contains two local
maxima, one slightly biased on the co-operative side and another that is more marked
towards the non co-operative side.  Thus the system is beginning to shows signs of an
emergent bimodal structure, with larger co-operative and competitive clusters beginning
to self-organise.







Figure 5 illustrates a third scenario in which there is a high technological intensity, b =
1.25.  The end state that emerges at this level of technological intensity differs
significantly to the previous cases.  Here the system undergoes a bifurcation such that
dominance by one type of behaviour – whether this be competition or alternatively co-
operation in innovation networks – is the most probable end state.  It is not possible to
predict ex-ante which behaviour will dominate because convergence to one or the other
end state critically depends on fluctuations that occur during the phase-transition.  Due to
the networking costs integrated in this model, the left non co-operative peak is somewhat
stronger.  However an informal innovation network can self-organisationally emerge by
surmounting the short-term self-enhancing and wide-range attenuation effect.  In the
course of time technology maintains its importance in this industry, making it attractive
for firms either to stick to a competitive strategy or else create large innovation networks.
Figure 5.  System development with high technological intensity (b > 1)
This type of solution has been observed in empirical case studies (see Eliasson, 1995).
For example, informal networks play a dominant role in sectors such as semi-conductors
and biotechnology-based combinatorial chemistry.  These fields of knowledge production
are characterised by significant technological dynamics and by firms that are highly inter-
dependent.  Firms are apparently unable to be individually self-sufficient in the
acquisition of critical complementary knowledge, participation in informal networks
being a decisive mechanism through which firms seek to maintain themselves at the
leading edge of the technological frontier.  Yet this form of co-operative know-how
exchange is more or less absent in sectors that are equally technologically dynamic and
have ostensibly similar characteristics.  In organic chemistry, for example, we see an
industry structure in which firms are more or less self-sufficient in the production of




The self-organisation model has a number of interesting properties.  First, the results
accord with von Hippel’s empirical observations regarding the willingness of firms to
engage in informal knowledge trading.  However the model is able to generate these
without making strong assumptions (as von Hippel did) about the abilities of individual
agents to collect, evaluate and compare all internally- and externally-held information.  In
this model agents’ decisions on whether to co-operate in innovation networks depend
upon the size of the co-operative environment, whether this is growing or declining, and
the costs of networking.  If the number of co-operating firms - and hence the returns to
the external knowledge pool - is growing, the gains of co-operative behaviour increases,
making it more attractive for other firms to join the network.
This leads us to a second property of the model.  Multi-scale effects arise in this model
because local interactions between agents generate co-operative and competitive
aggregate structures which in turn affect individual decision-making.  Hence stable and
ordered paths of change emerge as the (partly) unintentional outcome of interactions
between individual agents.  This result nicely illustrates Nelson’s point that the basis of
networked innovation is not only to be found in strategic decision-making but is strongly
influenced by the industrial environment in which firms operate.  Finally, the model
contains multiple possible end-states.  Convergence to one or other end state depends on
small differences that occur at crucial points in time.  This emphasises the point made by
Silverberg et al regarding the nature of uncertainty in real historical time (also see Arthur
(1989) and David (1985) on this point).  Decisions in our model are frequency-dependent
and so it is impossible to predict ex ante which type of behaviour will eventually come to
dominate.  Given this interdependence between firms’ strategic choices, bandwagon
effects can quickly spread as a result of previous changes in behaviour.  As a
consequence, selection of one or other end state is non-ergodic and highly sensitive to the
way in which the sequence of decisions are built up.16
5. Conclusions
The prevalence of innovation networks is now such that one cannot dismiss them as a
temporary phenomenon.  In this paper we have proposed that the development of a self-
organisation perspective of innovation networks is advantageous for a number of reasons.
First, it provides a general framework of dynamic systems in which various strands and
themes, in what remains a largely fragmented field of investigation, can be drawn
together.  Second, the formal modelling techniques developed in the self-organisation
literature offer interesting new insights into the micro-macro processes driving system
dynamics.  In this paper we have focussed on the rationale for co-operative behaviour by
firms within horizontally structured innovation networks.
The paper emphasised that transferring the core concepts and modelling methods of self-
organisation theory from natural to social science domains is a non-trivial task that must
be handled with care, the success of the venture being judged on the ability to appreciate
social phenomena that cannot be appreciated under an existing (alternative) theoretical
perspective.  For this reason, the paper began by identifying the four key principles of
self-organisation: local interaction, non-linearity, thermodynamic openness and
emergence.  This was followed, in section 2, by a brief overview of the ‘new’ theory of
innovation.  Self-organisation theory complements the ‘new’ theory of innovation, the
latter emphasising the systemic nature of knowledge production within networks that
contain multiple private and public institutions that are connected in highly complicated
and non-linear ways.  Section 2 also highlighted the way in which key stylised facts of
inter-firm co-operation within formal and informal innovation networks described by
previous authors can be brought together under a self-organisation rubric. This prepared
the way for the formal model of self-organising innovation networks presented in section
3.
Turning to the formal results of the paper, we find the model is capable of generating two
important insights into horizontally structured innovation networks.  First, it can generate
co-operative structures in which individual firms willing engage in informal knowledge
trading.  This accords with von Hippel’s empirical observations.  However a key
advantage of the model over von Hippel’s own analysis is the ability to derive this result
without making strong assumptions regarding the information processing abilities of
individual agents.  A second result of this self-organisation model illustrates Nelson’s
argument that the basis of networked innovation is not just to be found in strategic
decision-making but is strongly influenced by the industrial environment in which firms
operate.  This is due to the existence of multi-scale effects in the model, interactions
between agents generating aggregate structures that in turn influence individual decision-
making.  Stable and ordered paths of change emerge through dynamic recursions between
the different micro and macro levels of the model.  Finally, multiple end states are
permissible in the model, convergence to one or other end state depending on the17
sequence of decisions that are built up over time. This reaffirms previous analytical
results regarding the nature of individual economic choices that are made in non-ergodic
and inherently non-linear environments.
To conclude, the paper has sought to indicate the advantages offered by the self-
organisation approach to research in innovation networks.  We have emphasised that care
must be taken in transferring and applying the core concepts and modelling methods of
self-organisation theory to the social domain.  However the rewards for this effort are
potentially large.  The model developed in this paper generates results that are compatible
with the stylised facts of horizontally structured inter-firm networks.  At the same time
this is achieved without recourse to unrealistically strong assumptions about the
processing capabilities of individual firms.  In future work we shall seek to broaden the
current discussion to include university-industry linkages and the formation of policy
networks.18
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